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The paper addresses the subject of steering organisational behaviour through public
environmental policy with the intention to stimulate environmental innovations rather
than to impede them. It explores the applicability of the concept of “scope of choice”
which is the set of behavioural options from which organisations (industrial companies)
select their actual behaviour related to a particular policy issue. This concept is rooted
in main stream organisation theory. The central argument of this paper is that
organisations cannot be forced to innovate through a command and control approach,
but that they must get an optimal (not maximal!) amount of freedom of choice in order
to match their own preferences and interests with the targets of public environmental
policy. The paper results in a roughly sketched model for “meta steering” with freedom
of choice as the principle parameter.
1. Introduction
Public policy is essentially aimed at affecting behaviour of target groups or policy
subjects. Public policy is implemented through the application of policy instruments.
They affect the behaviour of target groups – or rather of its “members” - by affecting
the conditions for their behavioural choices, in terms of the behavioural options that are
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available or in terms of their appreciation of the behavioural options belonging to their
scope of choice.1
The concept “scope of choice” reflexes the axiom that organisations exist through
human action and that the actual form or behaviour displayed by an organisation can be
considered as one particular option selected out of a set of available behavioural
options.2 These choices concern no trivialities but vital aspects, such as organisational
form (structure, technology and culture), domain (products, services, markets), or
processes (input, throughput, output), in other words “strategic choices”. In this paper
the concept scope of choice is analysed in relation to compliance with public
environmental regulations and other requirements stemming from environmental
policy. Compliance is interpreted in terms of organisational behaviour, which concerns
things as technologies, production processes, use of natural resources, emissions, and
products or services.
Environmental policy has a specific relation with innovation, not only in a strict
technological sense, but also in a social, institutional or organisational sense. It is
obvious that environmental policy should stimulate innovative behaviour and certainly
not impede it (Norberg-Bohm, 1999). In consequence environmental policy will be
most effective if policy instruments offer an optimal scope of choice to the members of
the target group.3 This can be explained by the simple fact that the prospects of
effective social steering are better when one understands the position of the target
group. The aim of this paper is to explore the merits of the concept of scope of choice
as a parameter for social steering through environmental policy.
In this paper we: (1) explore the roots of the concept of scope of choice in organisations
theory, (2) briefly address the relevance of the concept within policy science and
economics; (3) formulate the outlines of a model for “meta steering” based on optimal
freedom of choice.
                                                
1 This classification may evoke reminiscences of rather orthodox views of public policy. Analyses of
the chances in the role of government as primal agency of social steering are acknowledged and
largely endorsed. It is contended that the argument presented in this paper is even more relevant
when the primacy and legitimacy of politics and public administration is no longer undisputed.
2 The discussion about the relation between individual and organisational actors is acknowledged, but
further elaboration on it is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefor behaviour of organisational actors
is considered as purposeful outcomes of interaction of individual organisational members.
3 The account is geared to environmental policy for industrial target groups, but its tenor applies
- mutatis mutandis – to target groups from other social sectors as well.
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2. The concept of scope of choice and its roots in organisation theory
The concept of scope of choice is not frequently used, but nevertheless it is rooted in
main stream organisational theory, notably the “open systems approach”, which is a
very broad category encompassing many of the major streams in organisational theory
since the 1960’s. This approach has its historical roots in functionalism - see also the
classification by Burrell and Morgan (1979) of contemporary theoretical approaches
under the “functionalistic paradigm”. The basic formulation has been delivered by Katz
and Kahn (1966), while further elaboration has taken place within various theoretical
approaches which are considered to be part of it, such as the contingency, resource
dependence, population ecology, transaction costs, and neo-institutional approaches.
Later formulations can be found in handbooks, such as Scott (1981).
The basic proposition of the open system approach is that organisations are functioning
within a wider social context. In order to survive and flourish, they have to establish
and maintain a certain symbiosis with this context. The core of the open system
approach is what I call the “congruency principle”, which says that there must be some
kind of match between organisational form and social context or situation. An
instructive way to illustrate this mechanism is Morgan's (1986) “organisations as
organisms” metaphor.
During the 1960’s the contingency approach had reached a dominant position with the
open systems approach. The merit of this approach has been to overcome the traditional
management idea of the “one best organisational structure”. In stead it showed that
there is a relationship between social context (“contingencies”), organisational
structure, and performance (see e.g. review by Donaldson, 1996b).
The concept of scope of choice as presented in this paper is inspired by the debate
started by Child (1972) when he criticised the deterministic nature of the contingency
approach.4 In accordance with the congruency principle of the open systems approach,
Child acknowledged the relevance of imperatives stemming from an organisation’s
contingencies, but he rejected the suggestion that the organisation’s structure is
determined by them. He pointed out that adaptation to contingencies assumes human
action and that managers (or the “dominant coalitions”) have a certain “room for
manoeuvre”. His arguments can be rephrased in the following points:
• there may be several ways to meet contingency imperatives (“functional
equivalents”), and contingencies may impose contradictory imperatives;
• a certain amount of “misfit” may be allowed as many organisations can function at
less than maximum effectiveness;
                                                
4 The controversy between voluntarism and determinism is one of the four major debates in
organization theory, according to Astley and Van der Ven (1983). They see Child as a mediator
between contrary positions.
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• it may be possible to change the contingencies in stead of the organisational structure
in order to reach the required fit;
• human action is basically indeterminate; change agents are subject to bounded
rationality, they may be unwilling to adopt the “best” structure, or they may be
unable to do so because of internal or external barriers
Child's argument received wide support and resulted in a serious onset to what could
have developed into a “strategic choice approach”, referring to the sub-title of Child's
paper.5 However, it never became a main stream within organisational theory, although
many of the new approaches that have successfully contested the position of the
contingency approach, such as the resource dependence, population ecology6, and neo-
institutional approaches, have taken aboard the points made by Child and other
strategic choice authors. Meanwhile authors such as Donaldson (1987; 1996a; 1996b)
have stood firm “in defence of contingency theory” and claim to have refuted all of
Child's critics.
My conclusion from the debate on determinism in the contingency approach is that the
actual structure of almost any organisation can be perceived as being chosen from a
collection of options. This is an imaginary construct, as it is impossible to make a
definite inventory of this “scope of choice”, while at the same time it is real, as it is
obvious that almost every particular organisation could have chosen a somewhat
different structure. The scope of choice of a particular organisation consists of all
options for which it can plausibly be argued that this organisation could chose them
without disrupting its well-being given the particular situation or context (constellation
of contingencies) it has to deal with. The name “scope of choice” is used to indicate the
amount of discretion or freedom of choice for the organisation. For the present
argument, it is assumed that it doesn’t apply solely to organisational structure, but that
it holds for every strategic choice, including the behavioural options for compliance
with environmental policy.7
The strongest argument by Child (1972) is the one on “human agency”. It is hard to
understand how “fit” between organisational structure and context can come about
without deliberate, purposeful human action. This aspect is neglected for a long time in
the contingency approach, but Donaldson has taken up the challenge by developing a
                                                
5 To name a few: Schreyögg (1978; 1980), Miles & Snow (1978), Montanari (1978; 1979), Litschert &
Bonham (1978), Hall & Saias (1980), Bourgeois (1984), Randolph & Dess (1984), Hrebiniak and
Joyce (1985), Dess & Origer (1987), Kay & Diamantopoulos (1987), Whittington (1988).
6 This applies mainly to Aldrich's (1979) version of the population ecology approach. The version by
Hannan and Freeman (1977) is much more deterministic.
7 The first time I have formulated this concept of “scope of choice” was in my dissertation (Schrama,
1991), where the concept was operationalised and measured in terms of varieties in organisational
form (structure and it-application) for 8 similar organizations in a similar context. Recently I
rephrased the concept for application in environmental policy (Schrama and Van Lierop, 1999;
Schrama, 2000).
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model of deliberate adaptation of organisational structures at contingencies
(Donaldson, 1987; 1996a). This is not the place to discuss his claim of having delivered
empirical evidence, but it must be mentioned that this issue of deliberate adaptation is
based on a “top-down” concept of organisational structure. Decision making is an old
and well explored theme in organisational theory, and since we’ve learned about
Simon's (1947) concepts of “bounded rationality” and “satisficing”, it is hard to belief
in deliberate adaptation that eventually brings every organisations this one best suited
structure. The idea of deliberate adaptation is even less appropriate for “bottom-up”
concepts of organisational structure, such as in the structuration theory by Giddens
(1979; 1984). In Giddens’ vision the process of production and reproduction of social
structures through human interaction is bounded by the wider social context. Thinking
in terms of possible outcomes, this is compatible with the idea of scope of choice.
By representing organisational structure or behaviour as the selection of a particular
option out of a scope of choice, it is possible to deal with some of the theoretical
problems mentioned here (although we rather get around than solve them). Focusing on
the scope of choice means that options than can be selected are distinguished from
those that can’t. In principle it doesn’t matter whether the selection of an organisation's
structure is deliberate and top-down or at random and bottom up; although the chance
that the pick falls outside the scope of choice seems to be lager in the latter than in the
former case. In any case, when its structure is not part of the scope of choice, the
organisation has to correct itself or will get into serious problems. In fact, many
theoretical approaches contribute to the fine tuning of the concept. Simon's bounded
rationality points at cognitive factors: an option must be known to be eligible for
selection. The contingency approach, among many others, stresses fact that an
organisation must be efficient in an economic sense in order to survive. The neo-
institutional approach (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) tells us that an organisation
must accommodate to its institutional context if it doesn’t want to be cut off from its
resources and has to select an allowed option. Still another lesson to be learned is that
in similar situation organisations may have a different scope of choice. Hannan and
Freeman (1984) argued about organisational inertia, the fact organisation structures as
developed in the past hold restraints for adaptations to changing circumstances. This
means that we must distinguish general conditions from and specific ones. A similar
argument distinguishes objective from subjective conditions. Objective conditions are
those that are independent of the perceptions of the people involved, subjective
conditions are related to these perceptions. As to the latter point, organisations can only
select a structure that is open in an objective sense, while must also be perceived as
such by those who decide about it.
In other words, many factors are affecting the choices made by organisations. From the
perspective of the concept of scope of choice, each of these factors is related to a
particular set of behavioural options available to the organisation. But in order to
qualify for actual selection, an option must be part of each of these sets. There is no
need to present an exhaustive review, as a short reference to some of the most obvious
ones is sufficient to explain the argument:
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• existing and tested behavioural options (technological factors);
• feasible behavioural options (economic factors);
• familiar behavioural options (cognitive factors);
• acceptable behavioural options (psychological factors);
• legitimate behavioural options (social factors);
• legal behavioural options (legal factors);
• allowed behavioural options (institutional factors).
3. Multi-disciplinary aspects
Now the concept of scope of choice and its descent is explained, we will address its
applicability for public policy and the promotion of environmental innovations. The
point is that scope of choice is a tool for acquiring insight in the considerations of the
target groups. This brings us to two obvious disciplines: policy science and economics.
Policy science
As stated above, the quintessence of public policy is to influence behaviour of target
groups. The best entry for demonstrating the relevance of scope of choice is through
the “policy cycle”. This is a familiar concept in policy sciences and can be
characterised as an ideal type sequence of steps for effective solving of policy
problems. It includes stages like problem formulation, policy formulation, policy
implementation, and finally evaluation (cf. Hoogerwerf, 1985). From the perspective of
the present account, one can say that when the policy problem and targets are
formulated, it must be possible to think in terms of target groups and the policy relevant
behaviour displayed by their separate (organisational) members, the policy subjects.
One further step is to think of a particular scope of choice for these actors and the
classification of the elements of this scope of choice as either “desirable” or
“undesirable”, or “conformant” or “non-conformant” with the policy targets.
No actual attempt to influence behaviour has occurred yet, as this requires the
implementation of the policy and the application of policy instruments. In this respect
the applied policy instruments can be “restrictive” or “enlarging” (Bressers and Klok,
1988; Bressers and O’Toole, 1999). Restrictive means that the scope of choice is
narrowed down by imposing conformant or forbidding non-conformant behavioural
options, or by making non-conformant options are less attractive or discouraging them
by raising barriers. On the other hand enlarging means that new behavioural options are
opened up for the target group, made more attractive, or promoted by removing
barriers.
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There are basically three types of policy instruments: legal, economic, and social. Legal
instruments involves the application of the rule of law. This is not confined to
commands and prohibitions, as legal instruments may also make certain behavioural
options subject to conditions, as happens with permits. These instruments primarily
affect the set of legal behavioural options. Economic or market oriented instruments
interfere with economic factors, predominantly the costs and benefits related to
behavioural options. These instruments primarily affect the set of feasible behavioural
options. Obvious examples are levies and subsidies. Social or communicative
instruments8 interfere with several kinds of factors, such as cognitive, psychological,
and social ones. Policy makers are badly equipped for dealing with the domain of
society (as distinguished from state and market), as they have to rely mainly
communicative policy instruments. Roughly speaking two basic dimensions of this
domain can be distinguished: collective versus individual and subjective versus
objective. This universe contains diverse issues as social norms, psychological
preconceptions, available knowledge, which are related to the sets of legitimate,
acceptable, and familiar behavioural options.
Thus far the account has implicitly focused on direct steering; the stimuli emitted
through the public policy are directly aimed at actors are contributing to (or causing)
the policy problem and who have to change their behaviour in order to solve the
problem. Often indirect steering is to be preferred above direct steering. This means
that the policy stimuli are directed at intermediary target groups in stead of the final
target group, in particular when the latter is a so-called “barely accessible target group”
(Ligteringen, 1999). A well known example are the attempts to change consumer
behaviour through dealing with producers and retailers. The distinction between direct
and indirect steering involves a complication of the model, but it doesn’t affect its core.
Turning to the policy practice, we see that within environmental policy, but also in
many other policy fields, policy makers tend to back away from imposing mandatory
behavioural options on target groups, or ruling out behavioural options by forbidding
them. In terms of the conceptual model, a certain freedom of choice is always allowed
to the target groups. The general trend is towards enlargement of the scope of choice,
which can be illustrated by two issues. Traditional environmental permits contained
many so-called “prescriptions of means”, detailed instructions about required facilities,
equipment and procedures. The transition towards “prescriptions of goals” involves an
enlargement of the scope of choice, as companies are free to decide how they will meet
the relevant environmental demands such as levels of emissions. The second example
refers to a higher level of abstraction than environmental permits, and concerns policy
styles. “Policy style” is a current term to characterise the way policies are formulated
                                                
8 Within policy science the regular classification is legal, economic and communicative (e.g. Van der
Doelen, 1989). In my opinion, the classification concerns three basic domains (market, state and
society) and its dominant rationalities and drivers. Although they are part of the state, policy makers
can cross-over into other domains: economic drivers are addressed with economic instruments, social
drivers (social norms and values) are usually addressed drivers with communicative instruments.
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and implemented (cf. Richardson, 1982). The traditional regulatory style – also known
as “command and control” – has given way to policy styles which are more
“consensual” and based on “self-regulation” (cf. Huitema and Van Snellenberg, 1999;
Schrama, 1998). The dimension of regulation versus self-regulation indicates the extent
to which policy makers are seeking commitment from target groups to the policy goals
in order to assure that they will make a serious effort to contribute to the realisation of
these goals, while regulators themselves keep some distance from the process, as in the
voluntary agreements.
It is obvious that freedom of choice is an important parameter for steering behaviour
through public policy. It can be argued that this is the most important one, but it is
certainly not the only relevant one. Without going into detail, the following steering
parameters are mentioned in this paper:
• the extent to which policy is consensus-based and formulated through interaction
with the target groups;
• the addressees of the policy stimuli, or the choice for direct or indirect steering;
• the level of ambition of the policy targets;
• the time horizon for the realisation of the policy targets;
• the steering strategy (legal, economic, or social) and the policy instrument mix.
Economics
In the eyes of social scientists, main stream economics is based on some remarkable
assumptions, such as rational behaviour of the “homo economicus”, absence of
transaction costs, perfect information, and perfect competition. We understand that
these assumptions are necessary for economic modelling, but we know that they are no
adequate representation of reality. Scope of choice as a theoretical concept doesn’t
make much sense in neoclassical economics, as utility maximisation suggests the
existence of one best option and the market will rule out all sub-optimal choices.
Environmental regulation for industry is often criticised from neoclassical economics
because it imposes extra costs on industry and it is detrimental to competitiveness.
However, Porter and Van der Linde have taken issue with the neoclassical point of
view through “Porter's thesis” (Porter, 1991; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995a; 1995b).
This thesis argues that environmental regulation involves stimuli that activate industry's
capacity to innovate and will finally improve competitiveness. The debate on the
situations and conditions to which Porter's thesis applies, as well as the search for
empirical evidence did not result in unambiguous conclusions (e.g.: Jaffe and Palmer,
1996; Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins, 1995; Palmer, Oates, and Portney, 1995;
Stewart, 1993). The relevancy to the present paper is in the attention paid to market
imperfections. Apparently some companies are unaware of “win-win-situations” within
their own scope of choice, or they don’t select them without some pressure from
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environmental regulation. Porter and Van der Linde have reached some conclusions
that can be rephrased in terms of scope of choice:
• environmental regulation should be restrictive by formulating policy targets at a high
level of ambition, which means that many behavioural options should be removed
from the available scope of choice and that the remaining undesirable behavioural
options should be made very unattractive;
• at the same time environmental regulation should be enlarging by avoiding all kinds
of prescriptions of means, including the rule of applying BAT, and by using a
relatively long term time horizon for meeting the requirements;
• uncertainty about the content and significance of the regulations should be reduced
through good communication with the target groups, which affects their
appreciation of behavioural options in terms of their legality or economic
feasibility.
4. Towards a model for meta steering
Rationales for enlargement of the scope of choice
This paper argues that policy makers who have a target group in mind should be aware
of the actual scope of choice for this target group. By formulating policy goals policy
makers are implicitly classifying all available behavioural options as either conformant
or non-conformant with the policy targets. The art of policy making is to get the target
group away from non-conformant towards conformant behavioural options. There are
two different kinds of settings. The first one is based on the assumption of a “fixed
state of the art” applies, which means that all behavioural options are existing
somewhere and can be known by the relevant actors. Under this assumption innovation
is merely diffusion of innovative behavioural options that are already applied by other
organisations. The policy style can be more or less coercive and the target group can be
committed to results. Principle rationales in favour of enlargement of the scope of
choice are:
1. acceptance of the policy by industrial actors will be encouraged when companies are
free to choose any behavioural option which is conformant with the policy goals;
2. policy makers have limited knowledge about the merits of all behavioural options.
For the second setting the state of the art is not fixed. Conformity with the policy
targets may require the selection of behavioural options which are not yet known or
tested elsewhere. The game is stimulating environmental innovations and the policy
style must be more consensual, while the target group can only be committed to
making serious efforts. Additional rationales for enlarging the scope of choice apply:
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3. the development of new behavioural options in order to realise necessary
environmental innovations is no governmental task;
4. the realisation of environmental innovations cannot be enforced, nor does
government have sufficient knowledge about the nature of the innovation or the way
to proceed;
5. stimulating and facilitating processes of innovation is incompatible with restrictions
of the freedom of choice.
Frontrunners, mass, and laggards
It is evident that the level of ambition for environmental policy targets must be high.
This raises the question whether all members of a target group, for instance a particular
branch of industry, must be treated in the same way. It is a classical axiom of good
administrative behaviour to treat all policy subjects as equal. Nevertheless, there must
be a way to differentiate within the limits of legitimate governmental action. The idea
is to differentiate according to the “environmental orientation”, the extent to which
companies have integrated environmental considerations into their own corporate
decision making. A useful metaphor is the bicycle race, where participants either
belong to the frontrunners, the mass, or the laggards.9
Leggards are prone to select undesirable or non-conformant, if not illegal behavioural
options. They distinguish themselves in this respect from the mass, the majority of the
target group to which they belong. Application of the scope of choice as an analytical
tool points to the fact that there are existing and tested behavioural options, like those
already applied by the mass, but that the regular approach was not effective for this
group. In general, a more firm, explicit and consistent approach is a solution, but
regulators must be aware of the particular barriers involved. Some authors on
environmental regulation focus on the issue of laggards. Ashford, for example, urges
for a firm treatment of laggards or “dinosaurs” (e.g. Ashford, 1993; 1994; 1996;
Schrama and Van Lierop, 1999). Regulators should not tolerate disproportionate
environmental burdens from these companies, as they often have poor economic
prospects and are deemed to vanish anyway. According to Ashford, corporate
responsiveness to regulatory requirements can be analysed in terms of willingness,
capacity, and opportunity. In terms of the scope of choice, relevant barriers for laggards
are economics, cognitive, or psychological factors, that distinguish them from the mass.
Frontrunners are another category that may be eligible for a special approach by
environmental regulators. The issue is that frontrunners are likely to face the limits of
                                                
9 The issue of accommodating the way individual companies are approached by environmental
regulators to their environmental orientation has been raised in a series of research projects
commissioned by the formal “Evaluation Committee Environmental Management Act” between 1992
and 1996. One of these reports was Arentsen, Klok, and Schrama (1994).
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the state of the art (and their scope of choice) before the mass does. Environmental
policy to frontrunners must contain stimuli to keep them motivated to pursuit further
environmental improvements and to help them to remove possible barriers. These
barriers are probably related to technical, institutional, legal, or economic factors.
Actual enlargement of the scope of choice of frontrunners may be beyond the power of
policy makers, notably when this requires the realisation of (technological) transitions.
Stages of a model for meta steering
While regular policy is steering of organisational behaviour, assessing the optimal
amount of freedom of choice for a policy target group is rather “meta steering”. Ideally,
this involves the following stages:
• a well considered assessment of the environmental problem and the policy targets,
including applicable scale, level of ambition, and time horizon;
• identification of target groups of social or organisational actors who are causing the
problem or may contribute to the solution, including the choice between direct
steering or indirect steering through intermediaries;
• target group assessment: environmental orientation, priority assigned to the issue,
and available scope of choice.
• assessment of the optimal freedom of choice for the target group: (a) discouraging or
prohibiting of non-conformant behavioural options, (b) stimulating the choice of
conformant behavioural options by making them more attractive or removing
barriers, (c) supporting the realisation of new behavioural options;
• selection of policy style and policy instruments mix.
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